The concurrency control requirements for transaction processing in a multilevel secure le system are di erent from those in conventional transaction processing systems; in particular, there is the need to coordinate transactions at di erent security levels avoiding both potential timing covert channels and the starvation of transactions at high security levels. Suppose a transaction at a low security level attempts to write a data item that is being read by a transaction at a higher security level. On the one hand, a timing covert channel arises if the transaction at the low security level is either delayed or aborted by the scheduler. On the other hand, the transaction at the high security level may be subjected to an inde nite delay if it is forced to abort repeatedly. This paper extends the two-phase locking mechanism that is suitable for conventional transaction processing systems, to multilevel secure data management systems. The scheme presented here avoids the abort of higher level transactions, nonetheless guaranteeing serializability. The system programmer is provided with a powerful set of linguistic constructs which supports exception handling, partial rollback and forward recovery. The proper use of these constructs can prevent the inde nite delay in completion of a high level transaction, and allows the system programmer to trade o starvation with transaction isolation.
Introduction
Transactions represent an important functionality that any data management system (either a le system or a database management system) must provide. Conventional and advanced DBMSs provide a transaction management subsystem in charge of transaction synchronization and recovery. Because of the relevance of the transaction paradigm in application development, transaction facilities are now being o ered as part of advanced le systems as well. Indeed, a large class of applications exists for which the full power of a DBMS may not be required, but for which reliable, concurrent access to shared data is a crucial requirement. As a result, transaction facilities are now being supported in many le systems such as Camelot EMS91] and Arjuna SM94] .
While transaction management techniques and algorithms are fairly well understood for data management systems, this is not the case for multilevel secure systems. In such systems, the data and user processes are classi ed into di erent security levels, and access to a data item by a process is governed by the following mandatory access rules: A process P can write to a data item x only if x is at the same security level as that of P, and can read x only if x is at a security level lower than or equal to that of P (cf. BL76]).
The development of a multilevel secure data management system requires a careful revisitation of the architectural components, techniques and algorithms used in a conventional non-secure system. If a system intended to be secure is not designed properly, it may have covert channels Lam73, Den82] which can be exploited by sophisticated intruders to gain illegal access to data.
Secure transaction processing is not easily achieved by the conventional techniques, as these have grave security implications. To illustrate, consider the following example. Let T i be a high level transaction which is reading a low level data item x, and T j be a low level transaction which is trying to write to x.
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Assume that the concurrency control mechanism uses two-phase locking (2PL) and, therefore, the transaction T j will have to wait to acquire a lock on x until such time as T i releases its lock on x. Suppose T j can measure the time quantum, q, it has to wait to acquire the lock on x; a quantum of waiting time greater than a certain amount is considered to be a 1 and below that is considered to be a 0. This knowledge can be exploited by T i to send one bit of high level information to T j , and by repeating this protocol any arbitrary information can be sent. This indirect way of sending information, against the security policy of the system, is an example of a timing covert channel. In order to prevent the class of timing covert channel, that arises from the use of a lock-based protocol for transaction synchronization, a low level transaction cannot be delayed or aborted, because of a lock con ict with a high level transaction.
To date, no research e ort has been reported dealing with the problem of secure concurrency control in the context of secure le systems, although this problem has been investigated within the framework of database systems. In KTS90], Keefe, Tsai and Srivastava present a formal framework for secure concurrency control in multilevel databases. Lamport Lam77], Reed and Kanodia RK79] and Schaefer Sch74] o er solutions to the secure readers/writers problem. While these solutions are secure, they do not yield serializable schedules when applied to transactions (since transactions contain read and write sets that are often related). Moreover, they su er from the problem of starvation, i.e., transactions that are reading lower level data items may be subject to inde nite delays. Ammann and Jajodia AJ92] give two timestamp based algorithms that yield serializable schedules; however, both su er from starvation.
Recently, secure versions of commercial DBMSs are providing concurrency control that is free of timing covert channel; however, the solutions adopted in these systems are not completely satisfactory. For example, the concurrency control algorithm of Trusted Oracle DBMS Ora92] is based on a combination of 2PL, multiversioning and timestamp ordering. As shown in JA92], the histories generated by this concurrency control algorithm are not always one-copy serializable. As an additional example, Informix-OnLine/Secure DBMS Inf93a, Inf93b] uses an approach in which a low level transaction can acquire a write lock on a low data item, even if a high level transaction holds a read lock on this data item. Thus, a low level transaction is never delayed by a high level transaction. The high level transaction simply receives a warning that a lock on a low data item has been`broken.' However, despite the broken lock, the high level transaction is still committed, unless the programmer has explicitly added some code to perform rollback of the transaction. A major drawback of the Informix approach is that no information is provided to the high level transaction specifying which lock has been broken if the transaction has acquired locks on several low data items. Thus only a very primitive handling of broken lock exceptions 5 Throughout this paper, we use the terms high and low to refer to two security levels such that the former is strictly higher than the latter in the partial order.
is possible at the application program level.
The goals of this work are: 1. to provide a multi-level secure le system architecture that supports secure transaction processing, and to isolate the trusted components 6 in such a system; 2. to provide a set of linguistic constructs to support exible yet powerful systems programming. In particular features for exception handling, partial rollback, and forward recovery are incorporated within the transaction paradigm; 3. to extend strict 2PL on single version data items for concurrency control in secure transaction processing; 4. to avoid the abort and thereby starvation of the high level transaction when a low level transaction acquires a con icting lock; 5. to guarantee serializable execution of concurrent transactions; 6. to close those timing covert channels that arise due to lock-based transaction synchronization; and 7. to provide a secure hierarchical locking facility in order to reduce the number of con icts between transactions. In addition to the usual read and write locks of strict 2PL, our protocol uses an additional lock mode called the signal lock, which is acquired by a high level transaction T i to read a lower data item x. Unlike a read lock, the signal lock does not con ict with a write lock, and hence a low level transaction T j requesting a write lock on x is never delayed or aborted because of the read by T i . The system noti es T i of the existence of the new value for x sometime after the write operation by T j , by sending a signal to T i . When T i receives the signal, it decides how to handle the signal. T i can ignore the signal, do a rollback, re-read the data item x or take some other action. Our scheme provides for delayed signals, i.e., the system sends all signals generated by T j together, after the last write operation of T j , instead of sending a signal immediately after each write operation. In particular, if T i reads x before T j writes to it, and commits before the system can notify T i , no signal is handled (or serviced) by T i . The use of delayed signals not only allows the notions of exception handling and forward recovery, as de ned in Cri82], but also increases concurrency among transactions while preserving serializability, as will be shown subsequently.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the security model on which our work is based. Section 3 provides an overview of the approach. In particular, Section 3.1 presents the system architecture. It identi es the trusted and untrusted components of the system as well as their various functions. Section 3.2 de nes the three di erent types of locking operations and also provides the lock compatibility matrix used for 6 A component is trusted if its software operates awlessly for the system to enforce security policy correctly. This requires developing a formal speci cation of the component software and a demonstration that the implemented system is consistent with the speci cation. Since it is impractical to perform the latter task rigorously for large programs, it is necessary that the number of trusted components be kept as small as possible. 3 locking. Section 4 includes the description of the basic transaction model, with section 4.1 introducing the four new system calls for transaction processing, section 4.2 describing the Trusted Lock Manager and section 4.3 providing two examples of transactions in this model. Section 5 formalizes the notions of a well-formed transaction and histories, and proves that histories consisting of well-formed transactions are serializable. Section 6 describes an optimization of the basic locking protocol with the introduction of multigranularity locking in a hierarchical mode. Section 7 concludes the paper.
The Security Model
The multilevel secure system consists of a set D of data items, a set T of transactions (subjects) which manipulate these data items and a lattice S of security levels, called the security lattice, whose elements are ordered by the dominance relation . If two security levels s i and s j are ordered in the lattice such that s i s j , then s j dominates s i . A security level s i is said to be strictly dominated by a security level s j , denoted as s i s j , if s i s j and i 6 = j. Each data item from the set D and every transaction from the set T is assigned a xed security level.
In order for a transaction T i to access a data item x, the following two necessary conditions must be satis ed:
1. T i is allowed a read access to data item x only if L(x) L(T i ). In other words the transaction must be at a security level that dominates the security level of the data item x in order for T i to read x.
2. T i is allowed a write access to the data item x only if L(x) = L(T i ). That is, the transaction must be at the same security level as the data item x, if it has to write to x. Note that the second constraint is the restricted version of the ?{property which allows transactions to write to higher levels BL76, Den82] ; the constrained version is desirable for integrity reasons.
In addition to these two restrictions, a secure system must guard against illegal information ows through covert channels. The security model addresses only mandatory access control and no discretionary access controls.
3 Overview of the Approach 3.1 System Architecture The architecture of our multilevel secure transaction processing system can be divided into a trusted, an untrusted, and a passive component as shown in Figure 1 . The trusted component consists of two active elements: Trusted Lock Manager and Trusted File Manager. The untrusted component is a collection of Transaction Managers (TMs), one for each security level. The passive component is the File Store which may be physically partitioned according to the security levels. Note that the assumption about the Lock Manager being trusted can be relaxed by providing one Lock Manager for each security level. A Trojan Horse inside some untrusted Lock Manager can compromise the correct execution of concurrent transactions, but cannot violate security. However, as the whole body of a standard Lock Manager, written with all the requisite defensive programming, exception handlers, optimizations, deadlock detectors, etc. comes to about a thousand lines of actual code GR93], it is easily veri able. Thus the assumption of a Trusted Lock Manager, which jeopardizes neither security nor integrity, is justi ed.
Note also that although we use the term Trusted File Manager, this component need not be fully trusted. We refer the interested reader to SW88, IAT90, Irv95] for implementation of File Managers that require a small Trusted Computing Base as their only trusted component.
The function of the Trusted Lock Manager is to provide the basic operations of locking and unlocking data items. The functionalities of the Trusted Lock Manager should be designed and implemented so that they cannot be exploited as timing covert channels.
Speci cally, if a TM i acquires a read lock on a data item at level s j , where s j s i , the execution of such operation should be transparent to all subjects at any level s k with s k s i .
Transaction processing is implemented by a cooperation between the Transaction Man-agers, the Trusted Lock Manager and the Trusted File Manager. The services of the Trusted Lock Manager and the Trusted File Manager can be invoked by each of the untrusted TMs. A TM, on receiving an operation from a transaction, sends a request for the appropriate lock mode to the Trusted Lock Manager. When the Trusted Lock Manager acknowledges that the lock is set, the TM sends the operation to the Trusted File Manager which then is responsible for the actual access to the data item. Our locking protocol closes the timing covert channel that arises from using a lock-based concurrency control algorithm. This is due to the fact that a lower level transaction is never required to wait for a write lock on some data item x even if a high level transaction is reading x.
A transaction T k at the security level s i can read information stored at level s j only if s j s i , and can write information only at level s i . The corresponding TM i at the level s i controls the concurrent execution and the recovery of those (and only those) transactions that are at level s i , and hence TM i can be an untrusted component of the architecture. In particular, a TM i that does not set or release locks on data items properly, can cause integrity violations at all the security levels s j such that s i s j . However, this does not lead to a security violation because no information can be passed on to the lower levels from the higher levels through the modulation of the lock/unlock operations. This is a direct consequence of the fact that the Trusted Lock Manager provides the locking operations, transparently.
We require that the Trusted File Manager provide memoryless services on the le stores. respect to the lower level TMs, then these types of covert channels can be eliminated. The description of such a Trusted File Manager is beyond the scope of this paper. We refer to SW88, IAT90, Irv95] for description of multilevel le systems that provide le services to transactions at a particular level in a manner transparent to all lower level transactions. In our work, we discuss the design of the concurrency control mechanism that will close the timing covert channel, arising from the use of locking, as described in Section 1.
Locking Operations
We de ne three kinds of locks that a transaction may acquire in order to perform an operation on a data item.
Read Lock If a transaction wants to read a data item which is at its own security level, it has to acquire a read lock on the data item. Strictly speaking, this requirement is not necessary for closing the timing covert channel due to lockbased transaction synchronization. It has been added to close a number of other covert channels that can potentially arise. Write Lock If a transaction wants to write to a data item which is at its own security level, it has to acquire a write lock on the data item.
Signal Lock If a transaction wants to read an item which is at a security level lower than that of the transaction, it has to acquire a signal lock on the data item.
The lock compatibility matrix as used by the lock manager is given in Figure 2 . The compatibility matrix shows that the signal lock and the write lock are compatible in some cases but con icting in others. Speci cally, if a write lock is requested on a data item x, when it has already been locked by a signal lock, the write lock is granted; however if the signal lock is requested at a time when the write lock is already in e ect on the item, the signal lock is refused.
In principle, transactions that are reading down on a data item x do con ict with lower level transactions that are writing to x. However, we cannot delay or abort the low level transaction because doing so will open a timing covert channel. On the other hand, if a low level transaction is writing to x, we can delay the high transactions that wish to read x. It is precisely to implement this policy, a requested write lock does not con ict with a granted signal lock, but a requested signal lock does con ict with a granted write lock. If a low level transaction, T i wants to acquire a write lock on an item x while a high transaction T j is holding a signal lock on x, T i will be granted the write lock; however, if T j wants to acquire a signal lock on x while T i is holding a write lock on x, T j will be denied the lock, and has to wait till such time as T i releases the write lock. A typical example of interleaving of concurrent transactions T 1 and T 2 , called history, in this model is given in Figure 3 , where r i x] and w i x] denotes the read and write operations on data item x issued by a transaction T i . Note that this history is not serializable, as the operations of transaction T 2 follows r 1 x] and precedes r 1 y]. As we detail the model, it will be evident how the signal lock together with the proposed system calls remove any inconsistent concurrent execution from the history. As mentioned earlier in Section 3.1, transaction processing is achieved by the cooperation between a Transaction Manager, Trusted Lock Manager, and the Trusted File Manager in our model. A transaction consists of a sequence of system primitives, possibly interspersed with some other commands. TM is responsible for the system primitive commands while the run time support of the programming language is responsible for the other commands. TM relies on the Trusted Lock Manager for execution of some of these system primitives.
In this section we rst describe the transaction processing system primitives which are used by the programmer to develop a transaction. This description is accompanied by a pseudo-code for a TM, which gives the algorithm for these primitives. Next, we provide a description and algorithm for the Trusted Lock Manager. Finally we give two examples of typical transactions in our model.
Transaction Processing System Primitives
Before we give the description of the primitives for secure transaction processing, let us recall two assumptions of our basic transaction model. The rst assumption is that the system maintains single version of each data item and uses strict 2PL for concurrency control for transactions at the same security level. The second assumption, important from the point of view of security, is that a low level transaction cannot be made to wait for a lock to be released by a high transaction. This has been shown to expose a timing covert channel by which a security breach can take place.
In addition to the basic transaction processing system calls, namely Begin Transaction, End Transaction, Read, Write, Commit and Abort, the TM also supports the following four new system primitives: GetSignal sl 1 ! handler 1 ; : : : ; sl n ! handler n ]; Figure 4 shows the algorithm for the transaction manager module at any security level l.
(Note that the gure deals with only those portions of the module that are relevant to the four system calls.) The thread TransactionRunTimeSupport contains the code for all four transaction processing primitives and is executed for each active transaction as and when one of the primitives is encountered in the transaction code. The other thread of importance to us is the SignalReceiver thread. Its relevance will become evident as we proceed with the description of the model. For now, it is su cient to note that this thread keeps signals intended for a transaction T i in a queue associated with T i .
Description of the SaveWork and RollBack primitives
The SaveWork call establishes a savepoint, which causes the system to record the current state of processing. On encountering a SaveWork command in a transaction's execution, the TM writes on the transaction's log a savepoint record, while the run-time support of the programming language saves the current values of any local variables on the volatile memory. The SaveWork call returns to the transaction a handle in the form of the identi er sl, called a signal label. This signal label can subsequently be used to refer to that savepoint.
Typically, this handle is a monotonically increasing number. The transaction can return to any savepoint by invoking the RollBack(sl) primitive and passing to it the signal label, sl, of the savepoint to be restored. The execution of this command rst restores the state of the system to the state that existed at the time of the savepoint denoted by the signal label sl, and then reexecutes the operations that follow the savepoint. Depending on the application logic, the system programmer can decide to return to the most recent savepoint or to any other.
We assume that the successful execution of the Begin Transaction primitive establishes the default savepoint for a transaction.
Description of the RaiseSignal primitive
When a transaction T j at some security level invokes a RaiseSignal primitive, the Trusted Lock Manager sends a signal to each of those higher level transactions that have signal locks on data items being written by T j . That is, the Trusted Lock Manager considers all the data items x j 's on which T j holds write locks, and signals the TMs of those uncommitted higher level transactions that have signal locks on these x j 's (for example if a higher level transaction T i holds a signal lock on x j , then the TM for T i is noti ed by the Lock Manager).
Once these higher level TMs have been noti ed, the Trusted Lock Manager acknowledges the RaiseSignal call to T j . T j blocks on the RaiseSignal call until it is acknowledged by the Send a message to TO. The message includes the transaction identi er T i for the current transaction, the operation op to perform (Lock / Unlock), the identi er of the data item x on which to perform the operation and the operation mode Mode. Then wait for acknowledgement from TO.
ReceiveSignal(LockManager,TID,x) Returns the identi er of the signaled data item x, together with the identity, TID, of the transaction that initially had the signal lock on the data item x. Trusted Lock Manager. Eventually, if and when the higher level T i executes a GetSignal call (which is explained in the next section), its TM will notify T i about the new value for the low data item x j . This implementation of the RaiseSignal guarantees that the transaction histories are serializable, as will be shown later in Section 5.
Note that the lower level transaction T j never waits for either a GetSignal call from a higher level transaction or a higher level transaction to service (or handle) the RaiseSignal call that T j has just issued; it is upto the Trusted Lock Manager to correctly inform the TMs at higher levels about the RaiseSignal. T j only waits till it gets an acknowledgement from the Trusted lock Manager. This protocol is implemented in the Trusted Lock Manager avoiding potential timing covert channels. The RaiseSignal call guarantees that if a higher level transaction T i has read a data item x, which is then modi ed by the lower level T j , and if T i executes a GetSignal after the RaiseSignal of T j , then T i will service the signal of T j .
An issue that can arise in the reader's mind is what happens if the programmer does not issue a RaiseSignal. This will not cause any security violation, although it may lead to consistency problem because the higher level transactions will not be aware of broken signal locks. Later on we will show that RaiseSignal and GetSignal can be made a part of the End Transaction primitive, and hence they will be automatically invoked. This transparent invocation of the system commands not only reduces the programming e ort, but also guarantees a well-formed transaction and hence serializable histories. An alternative to having the RaiseSignal as a part of the End Transaction primitive is to implement immediate signals instead of delayed signals. What this means is that the Trusted Lock Manager informs any high level transaction that has a signal lock on a low data item x of the new value for x immediately when x is updated by a lower transaction. Consequently, even if the programmer does not issue a RaiseSignal, correctness of the protocol will not be a ected.
Description of the GetSignal primitive
The GetSignal primitive is used by a system programmer to specify how signals from lower level transactions are to be serviced by a high transaction.
The GetSignal call has two exit points: a standard one which is the next instruction in the transaction body after the GetSignal instruction and an exceptional continuation which is one sl i ! handler i from the expression sl 1 ! handler 1 ; : : :; sl n ! handler n ] Each sl i represents a signal label and the corresponding handler i represents a piece of program code to be executed for this signal label. The exceptional continuation is taken when the signal label sl i is returned by the transaction manager to the GetSignal call.
When a transaction T i invokes a GetSignal call, its TM considers all the signals that have been received on behalf of T i , after the last GetSignal invocation by T i , and selects only one signal to send to T i . The default invocation for GetSignal is GetSignal ! RollBack] which does not specify 14 any signal label. When a signal is to be serviced by this default GetSignal, it rolls back the transaction T i to the savepoint immediately preceding the earliest read operation among all the reads on the low data items performed by T i , that have to be redone owing to updates by low transactions. If no savepoint has been explicitly established in the transaction, then this default invocation rolls back T i , to the default savepoint coinciding with the Begin Transaction. It should be noted that the GetSignal call is non-blocking, i.e. the call does not wait for the arrival of a signal. If a signal is already available, it is serviced, otherwise no action is taken.
Trusted Lock Manager
The duties of the Trusted Lock Manager are summarized by the algorithm in Figure 7 .
Here a request is a tuple of the form (Sender, T i , op, x, mode), where Sender is the name of the TM sending the request, T i is the identi er of the transaction that is requiring the operation, op is the operation requested on data item x (e.g. lock, unlock, etc), and mode denotes the required lock mode. Before setting any lock, the Trusted Lock Manager checks if the security level of the TM and of the transaction are compatible with the lock mode requested for the data item x. It is assumed that the function to determine the security level of a subject, and in particular of the sender of a message, is trusted.
It is worth noting that the signal by the Trusted Lock Manager is a delayed signal. The Trusted Lock Manager noti es the relevant high level TMs of all the low-read/write con icts that have occurred, only when one of the low level transaction invokes a RaiseSignal command. One of the advantages of this scheme based on delayed signals is that if a high level transaction T j has read a low data item x, which in turn has been written by a low transaction T i , and T i invokes RaiseSignal after the last GetSignal of T j then no signal will be serviced by T j , and T j can go ahead and commit. This preserves serializability, as shown in Section 5 because T j has read the previous committed value of x, which is a correct value. Note that as a consequence the Signal locks can be released earlier than the commit time; in particular, the TMs can release the Signal lock of a transaction right after the last GetSignal returns a nil value. The earlier release of signal locks minimizes the communication between Trusted Lock Manager and the TMs. In the example above the Trusted Lock Manager would provide no signal to T j . In addition, the delayed signals reduce the overhead due to signal processing. Once a low transaction T i acquires a write lock on a data item x, the number of higher transactions to be noti ed can only decrease, not increase. This is because some of these higher transactions may commit before they are noti ed and all transactions arriving after T i that want to read x, have to wait till T i commits. The Trusted Lock Manager can further minimize the number of messages to be sent to a particular TM by grouping together in a single message, all signals to di erent transactions at the same security level.
Some Example Transactions
In this section we provide two examples of transactions in our models. The rst example shows a transaction that is guaranteed to maintain consistency in the le system. Later on in Section 5, we will show that this transaction conforms to the de nition of well-formedness if there is some transaction T k , that had previously requested a lock on x, but was not awarded the lock, then awake T k ; if there is a tie, then resolve in favor of lower level transactions. SetLock(T k ,x,mode); Send(TM L(T k ) ,T k ,lockOK); RaiseSignal: let x 1 :::x n be the data items locked in write mode by T i . for each T j that has a signal lock on x k do notify the TM of T j of a new value for x k ;
Send(TM l ,T i ,raisesignalOK); endcase forever Suppose that the GetSignal in line 13 of the transaction is currently being executed. If there has been no low level transaction which has updated data item x, then there will be no signal to be serviced, and hence the handler associated with the GetSignal will not be executed. If on the other hand, an update of x is signaled by a low level transaction, then the handler rolls back the transaction to the savepoint denoted by S 1 . Consequently, all operations in the transaction, starting from line 13 backwards till line 6 are rst undone and then the commands from line 6 to line 13 are re-executed. After this the transaction continues execution from line 14 onwards.
As T i continues its execution, at some point it performs the RaiseSignal at line 20. When this call is executed, the transaction manager, TM j , informs the Trusted Lock Manager to signal all those TMs that are at levels higher than TM j and have transactions with signal locks on z. T i blocks on the RaiseSignal call until the Trusted Lock Manager acknowledges that all the relevant higher level TMs have been informed. After this acknowledgement, T i continues from line 21. In line 28 of the transaction, we have a default invocation of the GetSignal command. If there is any signal to be serviced at this point, the transaction is rolled back to the savepoint immediately preceding the earliest low read operation among those signaled. For example, if both x and y are signaled, then the transaction will rollback to the savepoint S 1 . If on the other hand, only y is signaled, then the transaction will rollback to S 2 .
Savepoints can also be used in the transaction code merely to control the ow and rollback even without the occurrence of any low level read operation. An example of this is the savepoint S 3 established in line 21.
We would like to mention here, that if the GetSignals on line 13 and 25 are removed from the program code in order to simplify it, the transaction still remains well-formed. We explain why this is so later on in Section 5.
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Example 4.2 The transaction in this example is quite similar to the one in the previous example. Consequently, we describe only those steps that are di erent in this transaction. In particular, the only di erences between the transaction in Figure 10 and that in Figure  9 are in the GetSignal calls in lines 13 and 25.
Consider the GetSignal in line 13. If an update of x is signaled by a lower level transaction, then instead of rolling back the transaction, as in Figure 9 , the handler rereads the new value of x and updates the local program variables according to the new value. Note that there is no need to reread the high data item z. After this the transaction continues execution from line 14 onwards. It should be noted that here the programmer has exploited the semantics of the transaction in order to perform a forward recovery instead of a rollback. In particular, the forward recovery is possible because there is no update of the data store between the savepoint S 1 and the GetSignal in line 13.
Consider next the GetSignal in line 25 of Figure 10 . If x is updated, then the handler corresponding to signal label S 1 is executed and the transaction rolls back to savepoint S 1 . Note here that the programmer has speci ed a di erent handler for the signal label S 1 than was used previously with the GetSignal in line 13; the handler in line 13 performed a forward recovery.
On the other hand, if y is updated the handler corresponding to signal label S 2 is executed. In this handler the programmer has speci ed a conditional rollback. If the total number of rollbacks for this transaction is more than 4 till this point, the programmer does not want another rollback for y. Instead he wants that an alert message be delivered and the execution continue forward from line 26. This construct for conditional rollback, if properly used in all the rollback handlers, prevents the inde nite delay for completion of a high level transaction and thereby allows the programmer to nd a trade o between starvation and transaction isolation. /* x, y are low level data items which can be read but not written to. */ /* z and u are data items at the same security level as the transaction. */ /* RollBackCount is a user accessible system variable which is */ /* incremented by 1 each time a rollback operation is performed. */ /* This variable is initialized to zero only at the transaction beginning */ Example 5.2 r 1 y] sw 1 (sl) r 1 x] w 1 z] gs 1 (sl) undo(gs 1 (sl)) undo(w 1 z]) undo(r 1 x]) 2 1. Transaction T i acquires a lock in an appropriate mode on a data item x before performing an operation of that mode on x. Each lock operation of T i is eventually followed by a corresponding release of the lock.
2. Transaction T i , which is requesting a lock on a data item, has to wait if a con icting lock has already been acquired on the same data item by another transaction.
3. If T i has to rollback to a savepoint sl, it releases all the locks that it acquired after sl and up to its current point of execution and then reexecutes the code starting from sl, reacquiring all relevant locks as it proceeds. 4. Each GetSignal command in T i is well-formed. That is, for every gs i (sl) 2 T i such that sl 6 = nil; gs i (sl) < i rb i (sl). 5. In the execution of T i , at least one GetSignal follows the RaiseSignal call. The RaiseSignal command should follow the last write lock operation in T i and the GetSignal command should be after the last lock operation in T i .
In order to satisfy the conditions 4 and 5 above, the code of T i should be organized as follows: (1) For every SaveWork command of the form sl i := SaveWork, which is de ned before a GetSignal, there should be a handler in the GetSignal of the form sl i ! handler i ; also, handler i should contain the command Rollback(sl i ), and (2) The control ow analysis of the transaction should ensure that at least one RaiseSignal after the last write and one GetSignal after the last lock operation is executed.
An example of a transaction that is well-formed is given in Figure 9 . In contrast, the example of the transaction in Figure 10 is not well-formed, according to the de nition above for two reasons: (1) The GetSignal on line 13 does not contain any Rollback command; and (2) The GetSignal on line 25 contains a conditional Rollback. Such constructs can be convenient in practical system programming, since in many applications it is useful to have a compromise between correctness and performance GR93]. However, in order to ensure serializability the strong de nition of well-formedness is required as in De nition 5.8. The simplest way to make the transaction in Figure 10 well-formed, is to replace all the GetSignals by the default invocation of GetSignal, viz. GetSignal ! RollBack] thus satisfying condition 4 above.
In order to demonstrate that the relative order of the RaiseSignal and GetSignal, as stated in criterion 5 of well-formed transaction, is necessary to guarantee serializability, consider the example history in Figure 12. (In this gure, the dashed arrows indicate the temporal ordering of the operations, and not con icts among them.) Transaction T 2 is not well-formed because the GetSignal command precedes the RaiseSignal command in T 2 . Evidently this history which is rollback-free contains the cycle T 1 ! T 2 ! T 3 ! T 1 , and hence is not serializable. However, if transaction T 2 were well-formed, the history would be serializable. Note that in this latter case the RaiseSignal of T 3 is serviced by the GetSignal of T 2 , and the RaiseSignal of T 2 is serviced by the GetSignal of T 1 .
It should also be noted that only the last RaiseSignal, GetSignal pair contributes towards the well-formedness of a transaction. Indeed, even if all the GetSignal calls other than the last one in a transaction services all the relevant signals, it can always happen that the last GetSignal misses at least one signal as in the non-serializable history of Figure 12 . In From properties 1, 4, and 5 of well-formed transactions, it follows that T i ! T j , where transaction T i is at a level higher than T j , only if T i reads a low data item x which is subsequently written by T j , and T j raises the signal after the last GetSignal of T i . If this is not the case then T i is rolled back, the new value written by T j , is re-read by T i , and hence the con ict T i ! T j is removed. We summarize this observation as a proposition as follows: Proposition 5.1 Given two well-formed transactions T i and T j such that L(T j ) L(T i ), if T i ! T j in SG(R(H)) then gs i < R(H ) rs j .
This proposition is generalized to include also transactions at any two security level by the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1 Given two well-formed transactions T i and T j , if T i ! T j in SG(R(H)) then gs i < R(H ) gs j .
Proof: There may be three cases: T i and T j are at the same security level, T i is at a lower level than T j , and T i is at a higher level than T j . Note that if T i and T j are at incomparable security levels, they cannot have any con ict. Each of these cases is considered in turn:
1. Since transactions at the same security level use strict 2PL, at least the con icting operation op j in T j must follow the commit of T i . Thus, gs i < R(H ) c i < R(H ) op j < R(H ) gs j . 2. If T i is at a lower level than T j , again the reasoning in case 1 applies since the con icting read operation of T j is delayed until after the commit of T i . 3. If T i is at a higher level than T j and T i ! T j in the history, by proposition 5.1, gs i < R(H ) rs j . Thus, gs i < R(H ) rs j < R(H ) gs j . 2
Theorem 5.1 A history H consisting solely of well-formed transactions is serializable.
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Proof: By de nition of serializable histories, the rollback-free projection R(H) of the history H need be considered. We will show that the serialization graph for R(H), SG(R (H)) does not contain any cycle. Suppose SG(R(H)) contains a cycle T 1 ! T 2 ! : : : ! T n ! T 1 , n > 1. By Lemma 5.1, it follows that gs 1 < gs 2 < : : : < gs n?1 < gs n < gs 1 , which is a contradiction. 2
6 Hierarchical Lock Protocol
So far the le store has been viewed as an unstructured collection of data items. However, it is useful to view the le store as a hierarchy of di erent granules of data items. Although the granularity of data items is unimportant for correctness, it is relevant for system performance because the concurrency among transactions can be increased by the use of locks on increasingly ner granules of data items. A small granule lock is costly for a complex transaction that accesses a large number of granules. A coarse granule lock on a data item, on the other hand, would discriminate against the many small transactions that want to access just a tiny part of the data item. Thus the choice of a lock granule presents a tradeo between concurrency and overhead. A hierarchical lock protocol is particularly useful in a multilevel secure le store since it can reduce the number of signals to higher-level transactions.
We will assume that the lock manager uses the natural hierarchical relationship among the di erent data granularities present in conventional systems, that is: le store, area, le, block (page) and record. Such a hierarchical relationship of data items is represented by a lock type graph. Each edge in this graph connects a data type of coarser granularity to one of ner granularity. A set of data items that is structured according to a lock type graph is called a lock instance graph.
As stated in Section 3.1, the le store is partitioned according to security levels. This results in a number of lock instance graphs, one for each security level, with a le store granule at the root of each lock instance graph. All the data items in a particular lock instance graph have the same security classi cation. This results in a single level le store for each security level. In contrast, if all the data items at di erent security levels were to belong to the same lock instance graph, then a pseudo data granule, coarser than the physically coarsest, would be required at the root of this graph. This pseudo data granule would have to be classi ed at the lowest security level in the security lattice. Otherwise, any low data item which is in some interior node, would be invisible to a low transaction. However, if the root is at the lowest classi cation level, then a lowest level transaction can put a write lock on the root and thereby prevent transactions at other security levels to modify those portions of the lock instance graph which is at their level. Moreover, the costs associated with maintaining one extra granule in the lock instance graph is high GR93]. Thus, it is better to have single level le stores for each security level, for implementing a secure hierarchical locking protocol.
A lock on a coarse data x explicitly locks x and implicitly locks all descendants of x; for example, a read lock on a le implicitly read locks all the records in that le.
We de ne seven di erent kinds of locks. Of these, three are the read lock, write lock and signal lock described in section 3. The other four are generally termed as the intention locks. These intention locks allow the lock manager to ensure before locking a data object 26 x, that there are no locks on any ancestor of x that implicitly lock x in a con icting mode.
The di erent intention locks are described below.
Intent Read If a transaction T wants to read a data object x which is at the same security level as T, then it has to set intent read locks on all data items which are the ancestors of x in the lock instance graph, before setting the read lock on x.
Intent Write If a transaction T wants to write a data object x which is at the same security level as T, then it has to set an intent write lock on x's parent before it can set a write lock on x.
Intent Signal If a transaction T wants to read a data object x which is at a lower security level than T itself, then it has to set intent signal locks on all data items which are the ancestors of x in the data granularity hierarchy, before setting the signal lock on x.
Read Intent Write If a transaction T wants to read a data object x which is at T's security level and also wants to write to some part of x (i.e. to a ner granule of x) then T sets a read intent write lock on x. This is equivalent to setting a read lock on x and an intent write lock on x. The intent write lock on x ensures that write locks can subsequently be set on ner granules of x for writing. The compatibility matrix for hierarchical locks is given in Figure 13 .
Apart from the di erent compatibility matrix used, the Trusted Lock Manager for hierarchical locking is very much similar to the standard Trusted Lock Manager discussed in section 4.2. The only di erence is in the handling of RaiseSignal. In the Trusted Lock Manager module with hierarchical locking, if x 1 : : :x n are the data items previously locked in Write mode, then for each T j that has a Signal lock or an IntentSignal lock on x k the TM of T j has to be noti ed of a new value for x k ; if y 1 : : :y n are the data items previously locked in IntentWrite or ReadIntentWrite mode by T i , then for each T j that has a Signal lock on y k , the TM of T j has to be noti ed of a new value for y k . If T j has a IntentSignal lock on y k , then it is not required to be noti ed. Figure 14 shows the modi ed Trusted Lock Manager module with hierarchical locking. Only the portion for the RaiseSignal has been shown in the gure as the rest of the algorithm is the same.
Given a lock instance graph G that is a tree, the lock manager sets and releases locks for each transaction T i according to the following hierarchical locking protocol.
1. If the data object x is not the root of G, and is at the same security level as T i , then to set a read lock or an intent read lock on x, T i must have an intent read lock or an intent write lock on x's parent.
2. If the data object x is not the root of G, but is at a security level lower than T i , then to set a signal lock on x, T i must have an intent signal lock on x's parent. 3. If x is not the root of G, and is at the same security level as T i , then to set a write lock or an intent write lock on x, T i must have an intent write lock on x's parent. To read x, where x is at the same security level as T i , the transaction T i must own either a read lock or a write lock on some ancestor of x either explicitly or implicitly. (Note possessing a write lock on an object, enables a transaction to read it also.) 5. To write x, T i must own a write lock on some ancestor of x either explicitly or implicitly. 6. To read a low level object x, the transaction T i must have an explicit or implicit signal lock on some ancestor of x. 7. The transaction T i may not release an intention lock on a data item x, if it is currently holding a lock on any child of x.
The goal of the hierarchical locking protocol given above is to ensure that transactions never hold con icting (explicit or implicit) locks on the same data item.
Theorem 6.1 If two transactions obey the hierarchical locking protocol with respect to a given lock instance graph that is a tree, then they cannot own con icting locks on the same node of the graph.
Proof: It is su cient to show that two transactions cannot hold con icting locks when either one or both of the locks are implicit. Moreover, only leaf nodes of the lock instance 29 graph need be considered since if two transactions held con icting locks on a nonleaf node x, they would be holding con icting locks on all descendants (including the leaf) of x.
Two con icting locks on leaf x, with either one or both being implicit in nature, can occur in the following twelve ways. This is not possible since a read lock and an intent write lock con ict.
Case 2. By rules 4 and 5, T i owns a read lock on some ancestor y of x and T j owns a write lock on ancestor y 0 of x. There are three cases: a. y = y 0 which is not possible because this implies that T i and T j are holding con icting locks on the same node.
b. y is an ancestor of y 0 . In this case T j must own an intent write lock on y, which con icts with a read lock on y as in Case 1. c. y 0 is an ancestor of y. In this case T i must own an intent read lock on y 0 which con icts with write lock on y 0 .
Case 3. By rule 4 of the locking protocol, T i has a read lock on some ancestor y of x. And by rule 3 and induction T j must have an intent write lock on y. This is not possible according to the lock compatibility matrix.
Case 4. If T i holds an implicit write lock on x then T i holds a write lock on some ancestor y of x. In order for T j to get an explicit lock on x, it must have an intent write lock on x's parent and by induction an intent lock on y. this is not possible according to the lock compatibility matrix.
Case 5. By rule 5 T i owns a write lock on y, some ancestor of x and t j owns a write lock on y 0 , some other ancestor of x. There are three possible cases:
a. y = y 0 . This implies that both T i and T j have con icting locks on the same data item and is obviously not possible.
b. y is an ancestor of y 0 . This is not possible because if T j holds a write lock on y 0 it must have an intent write lock on y and thus a con ict with T i . c. y 0 is an ancestor of y. In this case T i holds an intent write lock on y 0 ; thus T j con icts with T i .
Case 6. T i holds a write lock on y, some ancestor of x and T j has to obtain an intent write lock on that y in order to have an implicit lock on x. This is not possible.
Case 7. For T i to have an implicit write lock on x, it must have a write lock on some ancestor y of X, on which T j has to acquire an intent signal lock, if it has to own a signal lock on x. This is not allowed according to the lock compatibility matrix.
Case 8. If T i has an implicit write lock on x, it must own a write lock on y, some ancestor of x. Similarly T j has to own a signal lock on y 0 , some other ancestor of x. As in Case 5 above, three di erent cases arises :
a. y = y 0 . This is clearly impossible. b. y is an ancestor of y 0 . For T j to hold a signal lock on y 0 it must have an intent signal lock on y which will then con ict with the write lock of T i . c. y 0 is an ancestor of y. In this case T i must have an intent write lock on y 0 , but then T j 's signal lock will con ict with this lock.
Case 9. In this case T i holds an intent write lock on some ancestor y of x, on which T j tries a signal lock. According to the lock compatibility matrix, these two locks con ict and hence this situation is not possible.
Case 10. The argument is similar to Case 7. Case 11. Follows from a reasoning similar to Case 8. Case 12. The same reasoning as in Case 9 applies.
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Lemma 6.1 A transaction which satis es conditions 3, 4 and 5 for well-formedness and obeys the hierarchical locking protocol for its lock and unlock operations is well-formed.
Proof Sketch: As shown in theorem 6.1 two transactions obeying the hierarchical locking protocol, cannot own con icting locks simultaneously on the same node of the lock instance graph that is a tree. Thus transaction T i , which is requesting a lock on an item, has to wait if a con icting lock has been acquired on the same data item, by another transaction. Thus the transaction T i satis es condition 2 for well-formedness and is well-formed. 2
Theorem 6.2 A history H consisting of well-formed transactions obeying the hierarchical protocol for locking and unlocking operations, is serializable.
Proof Sketch: The proof is similar to the proof for theorem 5.1 2 31 7 Conclusion and Future Work This paper extended the two-phase locking mechanism into the realm of secure transaction processing using single-version data items. In the proposed scheme, the only way data sharing among transactions at di erent levels can take place is by having a higher level transaction T j read a lower level data item x using a Signal lock on x. Since a lower level transaction T i can never access higher level data item, T i does not ever have to wait or be aborted owing to a con icting higher level transaction T j . This closes the timing covert channel that can arise owing to a lock based synchronization of concurrently executing multilevel transactions. In addition, deadlocks among transactions at multiple levels are also prevented. This is due to the fact that although, in this scheme, T j may have to wait for T i to release write locks, T i never waits for T j . This allows system deadlock detection by employing untrusted deadlock detectors at each security level. Each deadlock detector is responsible for possible deadlocks among transactions at its level. The proposed GetSignal, RaiseSignal, SaveWork, and RollBack commands allow a simple generalization of the at transaction model. The generalization is related to what are called sequential nested transactions in which transactions have an internal structure, though they are executed sequentially. In particular, transaction T starts a new subtransaction by executing a SaveWork call; sometimes T performs a Rollback to one of these savepoints aborting one of its subtransactions. The GetSignal corresponds to end subtransaction and, therefore, a commit operation, if nothing has to be noti ed. Indeed, in the sequential nested transaction model the commit of a subtransaction is essentially a null operation. The e ects of the transaction are made durable and public only when the top level transaction commits.
In order to reduce the programming e ort and make this approach more convenient for database applications, the proposed primitives can be invoked transparently in the application as follows. Every time a transaction requests a Signal lock, its transaction manager issues a SaveWork command. When the transaction completes and issues an End Transaction command, the transaction manager invokes rst the RaiseSignal command and then the GetSignal command. The GetSignal command invoked should be the default invocation, i.e., GetSignal ! RollBack] which, in case there is any signal to be serviced, will rollback the transaction to the savepoint immediately preceeding the earliest lower read operation that has to be redone. This transparent invocation of the system commands satis es the conditions of well-formedness of transactions given in section 5 and hence guarantees serializable histories. Further, it appears that for transactions that do not read lower level data items, there is no need to include any GetSignal command. These transactions can be simpli ed by invoking only a RaiseSignal at the commit of the transactions.
The goal of this work is not exactly to improve performance. Rather it is to provide a secure concurrency control protocol that is based on locks on single-version data, and to provide exibility to the system programmer. Indeed, our new system primitives allow the system programmer to emulate other secure concurrency control protocols like that of Inf93a, Inf93b] . Nonetheless, it appears that the ideas presented here can be suitably modi ed to support higher levels of concurrency in the conventional transaction processing framework thus leading to improved performance. This is because an update transaction can acquire a write lock on a data item, even though a read lock is already set on the same data item. Note that the overhead due to possible rollbacks will be reduced for shortlived read transactions as they will tend to commit before getting signaled by the update transactions.
As part of our future work, we plan to investigate the impact of this novel concurrency control mechanism on di erent aspects of transaction processing. In particular, it appears that the problem of commit protocols for secure transactions can be solved more e ectively within this scheme.
